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In this paper we will try to provide arguments for the thesis that language is
a physical system aiming at justicative adequacy: what architectural properties
license the occurrence of certain emergent phenomena. We will claim that the
derivational dynamics that can be found in language (and other systems of the
mind) should be analyzed from the perspective of complex non-linear systems,
as an open dynamic system. We will propose an oscillatory engine for linguistic
computations, which yields cycles as a natural emergent property given mutually
incompatible tendencies between output conditions: global semantic eects and
local linearization requirements. This architecture, in which structure building is
conditioned by irreconciliable conditions, congures a kind of dynamical system
well known in physics: a dynamical frustration. We will attempt to show that
interesting eects arise when we consider that there is a dynamical frustration at
the core of cognitive dynamics.
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1 Some introductory considerations1
The framework we adopt here, which has been dubbed ‘Physics of Language’
PoL (a term coined by Douglas Saddy; it was also the title of a recent conference or-
ganized by Roger Martin in Sophia University, Tokyo) is a program which analyses
1We would like to thank Doug Saddy, Massimo Piattelli-Palmarini, Giuseppe Vitiello, Juan
Uriagereka, and David Medeiros for enriching and stimulating discussion about dierent aspects
of the theory presented here. Doug Saddy has been particularly patient with our never ending
questions, and for that he has our eternal gratitude. Speakers and audience at the First Interna-
tional Symposium on the Physics of Language (Sophia University, Tokyo) have enriched this work
with pertinent questions and suggestions, and we owe them as well. The present paper has also
beneted from the comments of an anonymous Iberia reviewer, which we have done our best to
incorporate in the present version. We acknowledge partial funding from the European Union’s
Seventh Framework Programme for research, technological development and demonstration under
grant agreement no. 613465. The usual disclaimers apply.
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natural language in cognition as a physical system. Since language is part of the
natural world in a non-trivial way (that is, it not only occurs in the Universe, but is
a system that can be assimilated to others in that Universe), as Chomsky and main-
stream Generative Grammar have claimed over the years (Chomsky 1995 et. seq.;
Boeckx 2010a, 2010b; Di Sciullo & Boeckx 2011, among many others), it is assumed
to be ruled by the same laws at a principled level: abstracting material properties
of the elements involved, the generation of complex structures is considered to
be analogous in both mental and extra-mental domains. The PoL program strives
to answer questions concerning the integration of what we refer to as language
in a system of interacting cognitive capacities and furthermore advocates that lan-
guage as a physical system should therefore not be studied in isolation, but rather in
interaction with other systems. As this interaction occurs in the so-called ‘natural
world’, it is constrained by physical laws which are in turn particular instantiations
of mathematical possibilities, and restrict the amount of possible biological cong-
urations (Uriagereka 1998). Considering this scenario, PoL proposes the following
tenets:
(1) a. Language is part of the ‘natural world; therefore, it is fundamentally a
physical system.
b. As a consequence of (a), it shares the basic properties of physical sys-
tems and the same principles can be applied, the only dierence being
the properties of the elements that are manipulated in the relevant sys-
tem and the scale in which operations apply.2
c. The relevant operations are taken to be very basic, simple and univer-
sal, as well as the constraints upon them, which are determined only
by the interaction with other systems.
PoL licenses the possibility of looking for biological, physical and mathem-
atical properties of computations (i.e., syntax) in three levels: description, explan-
ation and justication. This claim is essential for our argument: we are not saying
that language ‘is like’ a physical system and, therefore, a mathematical structure.
We are saying that language is a physical system, as it exists in nature, is itself
the result of the interaction of other systems and, as we will see below, shares
deep properties with systems traditionally considered within the domain of phys-
ics, well beyond the level of metaphor. Interesting empirical predictions derive
2A reviewer pointed out that the space-time continuum and particle physics refute our thesis,
since the former is a continuum whereas the latter is discrete: notice that the characteristics of the
elements are irrelevant, since our focus is put on the operation that generates complexity in the
physical world. In any case, a quantum eld theoretical perspective would in turn refute the re-
viewer’s objection: particles are not discrete, but dynamical ‘local condensations’ of an underlying
eld. There is nothing ‘discrete’ in particles, if seen from QFT.
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from the PoL perspective (regarding, for instance, displacement phenomena in
natural language, the ontology of the structure-building algorithm, processing is-
sues, brain dynamics ... see Krivochen 2015a, 2015c; Grindrod et al. 2014; Piattelli-
Palmarini & Vitiello 2015, 2015; Medeiros 2015; Saddy 2016), and those can be
observationally contrasted (we are consciously adopting a form of Carnap’s 1966
model here) in order to determine the descriptive, explanatory and justicative
power of the model. The description is ‘the what’, the explanation is ‘the how’,
and nally, the justication is ‘the why’. The latter has been either taken for gran-
ted or done in a truly non-minimalist way both substantively and methodologic-
ally (consider, for instance, a feature-valuation driven syntax, and the amount of
stipulations it requires). Our eort, then, will focus on trying to set a radically min-
imalist alternative of justication, taking into account that a theory of the physical
universe must address all three: in this attempt of methodological and substant-
ive integration of the study of language within the more general study of physical
(which does not amount to ‘material’, contra Postal 2012: 5) systems at dierent
scales lies the main dierence between PoL and other approaches (which by no
means implies that those approaches are to be rejected). Attempting justication
is what we understand as the ultimate goal of going ‘beyond explanatory adequacy’
(borrowing the term from Chomsky 2004). This has a direct consequence for the
research program we are proposing: it is simply impossible to attempt to explain a
problem from just one perspective, but we need to understand the multiple facets
of a phenomenon: its computational dimension, the biological properties of the
system that allows such a computation (attending to Marr’s 1982 argumentation
about the need of an implementational level) and the physical principles that license
this biological conguration, expressed as a mathematical structure. From a meth-
odological point of view, then, our work has consequences for the foundations
of the ‘biolinguistic enterprise’ (Chomsky 2005, 2007; Boeckx 2010b; Di Sciullo &
Boeckx 2011, among many others) and its place within linguistic inquiry.
In this particular paper, we will make explicit a set of formal assumptions re-
garding the architecture of a model for language in cognition, partially shared with
recent syntactic research (Culicover & Jackendo 2005, Uriagereka 2012, Lasnik &
Uriagereka 2012):
• There is a computational system in charge of building symbolic structure,
which we will refer to as the ‘syntax’. This system is not domain-specic or
encapsulated. Thus, we make no dierence between FLN and FLB (contra
Hauser et al. 2002), insofar as the so-called interfaces (sound-meaning) are
computational (i.e., syntactic) in nature.
• The formal mechanics of the system is derivational but constraint-restricted:
derivations are free in nature, but if the generative component interfaces
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with interpretative components (e.g., semantics, phonology), input condi-
tions of those systems restrict the possibilities of generation.
• Derivations are continuous, oscillatory processes (contra Chomsky 2007,
where the diachronic nature of the generative operation Merge is explicitly
rejected, and the derivational engine is primarily proof-theoretical).
• Constraints are only determined by interpretative systems. Derivations are
syntactically unconstrained.
• Complexity arises in cognitive systems independently of each other, un-
less there exists a system that interfaces with them (e.g., the Conceptual-
Intentional C-I component, in charge of semantic interpretation at both
natural and non-natural meaning levels, and conceptual structure). Thus,
for instance, Conceptual Structures CS manipulating generic concepts (see
Jackendo 2002; Moss et al. 2007; Uriagereka 2012, 2014, among others) are
syntactically derived without there being natural language involved in any
way.
• Semantic requirements shape and drive the linguistic derivation.
• Cognitive interfaces are opaque (i.e., there is no one-to-one mapping or iso-
morphism holding between systems).
The next sections will be devoted to make our system explicit: how do we
derive? How do we evaluate the outputs of computations? What do we derive
with? Those are all questions we will deal with in the rest of the paper. Moreover,
we will make explicit some assumptions about the mathematical properties of the
generative component which go far beyond orthodox assumptions.
1.1 How do we derive?
In this paper we will focus on prolegomena for a mathematical formaliza-
tion of the biological and computational dimensions of language, provided that
we assume that the physical principles that license a biological conguration are,
in turn, particular instantiations of more general and less restrictive mathematical
structures: we will pursue the more restrictive claim that the accurate mathemat-
ical model to formalize linguistic derivations is some form of non-linear dynamics
(even though, as a reviewer correctly pointed out, this does not mean that all phys-
ical systems are non-linear, for instance, the superposition principle in quantum
mechanics is a linear superposition of eigenstates). This is already a departure
from orthodox generative models of language: the generative algorithms used
from Chomsky (1959) onwards (summarized in the famous ‘Chomsky hierarchy’
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for formal grammars and languages alike) assume linguistic derivations to be uni-
formly Turing-computable (Watumull 2012b, 2012a; Watumull et al. 2014), includ-
ing as a subset the proposals of Joshi (1985) and Uriagereka (2012), who argue
for a mildly-context sensitive computational system. Here and in past works we
have argued that all-the-way-down binary Merge falls short in some instances,
while assigning way too much structure to strings in some others (see Lasnik
2011, Krivochen 2015a, Bravo et al. 2015). We will argue that the computations
that underlie human language as a cognitive capacity are continuous, parallel, and
non-linear rather than strictly sequential, linear, and function-theoretic based (fol-
lowing Milner 2006, Goldin & Wegner 2005, Wegner 1997, among others), and thus
cannot be captured by classical computational algorithms, even Turing machines.
On the other extreme of the Chomsky hierarchy, some portions of natural lan-
guage grammars (those that involve no hierarchy between constituents, like itera-
tion and some kinds of coordinations, as shown in Krivochen 2015a and Krivochen
& Schmerling 2015) can even be formalized via a nite state grammar (Uriagereka
2008; Lasnik 2011) with better results in terms of adjustment between structural
description complexity and descriptive adequacy than higher-level phrase struc-
ture grammars or transformational grammars. In this respect, a uniform concep-
tion of the computational substratum of language is thus procrustean, as argued
in Krivochen (2015a) and Lasnik & Uriagereka 2012 (but the claim can be traced
as far back as Chomsky & Miller (1963)). The structure-building operation strictly
considered, and concomitant operations (e.g., Label) are to be reformulated taking
structural dynamicity into consideration, which in turn has crucial consequences
for the model of the mind assumed by a given linguistic formalism. It must be
noticed that the use of mathematical tools to formalize properties of language is
not a new idea (see Chomsky 1955; Harris 1968; the papers collected in Jakob-
son 1961, among others). In recent times, for example Di Sciullo & Isac (2008),
work within a set-theoretical framework in which the generative operation Merge
is driven by proper inclusion between feature bundles of lexical items, that is, the
set of intensional properties of item A must properly contain that of item B for
them to Merge and thus build a more complex structure; assuming, as orthodox
Minimalism does, that a lexical item is nothing but a bundle of such features – like
Case, Person, Number, Tense, Category, etc. – some of which enter the deriva-
tional workspace valued (and are, therefore, legible by the relevant systems that
interface with the computational system; in the case of language, sound and mean-
ing) and other must be valued throughout the derivation (Chomsky 1995; Pesetsky
& Torrego 2007;Panagiotidis 2009b, Wurmbrand 2014, among many others). For
example, using Di Sciullo & Isac’s (2008) notation:
(2) Lexical Item α = {N} (an interpretable categorial ‘noun’ feature)
Lexical Item β = {D, uN} (an interpretable categorial ‘determiner’ feature
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and an uninterpretable and unvalued ‘noun’ feature, to be valued via Merge
with an element whose features are a proper subset of those of β)







In a local relation created by Merge, the interface uninterpretable feature
[uN] is deleted, and the resultant syntactic object contains only elements which
the interfaces can read.
We will pursue a dierent possibility here, since the set-theoretical approach
to derivations require a rich feature system and an operation to relate those fea-
tures (Agree) in order to ensure the generation of fully legible units for the systems
of sound and meaning which interface with the so-called ‘Narrow Syntax’ (Chom-
sky 1995 et seq.). For example, Di Sciullo & Isac’s (2008) approach require a subset
relation between lexical items to enter into a Merge relation, which requires a
highly specied feature matrix for each lexical item (including categorial features,
person, number, and other formal features like [Wh-] for interrogative elements
and so on) and also principles determining interpretability and valuation condi-
tions: if a feature is to be dened as a valued dimension (e.g., + velar, in phonology,
means ‘positive value for the dimension ‘velar”). The theory grows in complexity
without improving descriptive or explanatory adequacy, since free-Merge systems
(Boeckx 2010b; Chomsky 2004) work just as ne, as we will attempt to demon-
strate, if constraints over the derived structures are appropriately formulated. We
will work with an essentially unrestricted structure-building formal operation, and
no features (this is, no [value-F] primitives and no Agree as the driving force of the
syntactic component); all constraints in this system are determined at the point of
interpretation for each derivational cycle. The general architecture resembles an
Optimality Theory-like model, a GEN(erator) – EVAL(uator) dynamics: there is a
structure-building operation and a series of interpretative routines, varying from
system to system, which evaluate the output of each operation in real time (an
architecture which is very close to the interactional model of computation of Mil-
ner 2006; Goldin & Wegner 2005, 2007). That said, our structure-building proposal
involves relating points in cognitive spaces with a specic topology thus forming
n-manifolds (Saddy 2016, Krivochen in progress). In strictly mathematical terms,
the operation can be formulated as follows:
(3) Concatenation denes a chain of coordinates in n-dimensional metric work-
spaces W of the form (x, y, z ... n) ⊂WX, ... (x, y, z ... n) ⊂WY, ... (x, y, z ...
n) ⊂Wn.
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Each set of coordinates, which for all intents and purposes can be identied
with a vector if we model the result of concatenation as an orientable manifold,
depends on the number of dimensions in the relevant generative workspace (a
mental working bench, see Stroik 2009; Stroik & Putnam 2013 for related claims
about the notion of working bench in syntax; and Uriagereka 1999, 2002b: for the
rst development of parallel computations in a Multiple Spell-Out model), such
that an element x is to be dened by all of its coordinates in W. Given this scenario,
let us see how a binary phrase marker qua manifold would be formed:
(4) Workspace 1 (W1):
Concatenate applies in the following form to elements active at the same time
in the same workspace:
(5) Concatenate(X, Y) = {(x, y, z) ⊂W1, (x’, y’, z’) ⊂W1)}
The coordinates of the result of the operation are dened as the Cartesian
product of the (in this case) two sets of coordinates of the elements involved in
the merger. In the more familiar tree form, the result would be represented as (6),
which is just a model:
(6)
X Y
Let us assume (6) is a sortal structure, to be merged with an eventive struc-
ture, to form (6):
(7) He saw the book
Concatenation would apply monotonically all the way (Uriagereka 2002b),
since the computational dependency between all objects involved in the derivation
is uniform: we have monotonic predication relations all throughout the phrase
marker:
(8) Concatenate (the, book) = {(x, y, z) ⊂W1, (x’, y’, z’) ⊂W1)
Concatenate ({the, book}, saw) = {(x”, y”, z”) ⊂W1, (x”’, y”’, z”’) ⊂W1}
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The following derivational step takes both structurally identical units and
merges them, generating the desired output in (8). Needless to say, the model
derivation in (8) is nothing but a model, and does not entail that the procedure in
physical terms is sequential or proof-theoretical. A mechanistic implementation of
structure building, however, is bound to step-by-step formalization, even if using
parallel stacks (Medeiros 2015). In physical terms, if the ground state of cognitive
dynamics is a topological space corresponding to an ultrametric eld (see Roberts
2015 for an application of ultrametric considerations to the phrase structure tem-
plate), relating elements basically amounts to making them interfere, which dis-
rupts the ultrametricity of the eld and introduces a metric between said elements.
That is the idea of Uriagereka (2011) and Saddy (2016), and for a eld approach we
think it is essentially correct. While in an ultrametric space the distance function
d between a point x ∈ X and a point y ∈ Y (for X and Y manifolds) is xed and > 0,
the intersection of X and Y at x, y means that d(x, y) = 0. If such intersection hap-
pens, we actually have a well-established mathematical/topological property that
determines a class of possible consequences. This property is the center manifold
theorem (CMT):
When an attractor of a high-dimensional dynamical system [...]be-
comes unstable there is typically one direction in the high-dimensional
space along which the restoring forces begin to fade; while in other dir-
ections, the stabilization mechanism remains strong. The one direction
along which forces fade spans the center manifold. (Schöner 2009: 9)
This process reduces the dimensionality of a problem near equilibria, and is
a well-known tool used to reduce the complexity of an innite-dimensional prob-
lem to a nite set of solutions with low dimensions. Cyclic structure building, we
argue, depends essentially on the CMT, which denes cycles at equilibria. If phrase
markers are conceived of as manifolds whose dimensional complexity is aected
by structure building operations (Krivochen 2015a; also Piattelli-Palmarini & Vit-
iello 2015, 2016, for a use of quantum eld theory’s ladder operators σ+ and σ– in
step-by-step derivations), there is an upper limit, a critical dimensional value de-
termined by the properties of the neurocognitive substratum of the system after
which no further structure can be accumulated in a single workspace without trig-
gering the CMT.3 This will be essential for our denition of a cycle.
Returning to the structure building problem from a linguistic perspective,
free generation has already been argued for in, for example, Chomsky (1995, 2004),
3In Krivochen (in progress) we proposed that 3 is that critical dimensional value, since we as
humans do not seem to be able to operate in metric spaces of more than 3 spatial dimensions
(mainly, because we do not need to do so in our phenomenological experience). In any case, the
specic critical value that triggers the CMT is an empirical matter, and must be treated as such.
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but from a dierent perspective: in his model, all operations are driven by fea-
tures in the Narrow Syntax. Moreover, our derivational model is closer to that
proposed by Putnam (2010) insofar as it is only interface-constrained. For the
purposes of the formal modelling of derivations, we propose an extremely local
evaluation mechanism, call it AnalyzeIL (SO) (that is, analyze a syntactic object SO
from the interface level IL) that applies after each instance of Concatenate and de-
termines whether the object is fully legible by the relevant interface; in the case
of language, Conceptual-Intentional C-I for meaning and Sensory-Motor S-M for
sound. Assuming the discussion in Boeckx (2007, 2010a), Analyze can be seen as
the interpretative systems (whichever they turn out to be) accessing the syntactic
workspace in which Concatenation applies, and taking the minimal unit they can
read. Merge, as we take it, is a completely free, n-ary operation that can apply as
long as the objects to which it applies have the same format, motivated by interface
conditions (this is, {α} is trivial at the interface levels, while {α, β} is not4). In the case
of language we have lexical items5, and we can say that they have the same format
(be them ‘lexical categories’ or ‘functional categories’) since they share a nature,
they are linguistic instantiations of elements that, per se, are not manipulable or
interpretable, like generic concepts (used by the visual capacity, for example, to
help organizing entities in the phenomenological world; see Jackendo 2002 for
a linguistic take on conceptual structures, Moss et al. 2007 for a neurocognitive
account). Once the ultrametricity of the ground state of the system dynamics has
been disrupted by an external perturbation, the only formal attribute of concat-
enation would be putting things together (bringing manifolds closer and making
them intersect, in the topological interpretation), without any restriction by prin-
ciple pertaining to the nature or number of objects, since it would be a stipulation.
An example of the formal model for derivational dynamics we are proposing is the
following:
(9) Concatenate (α, β) = {α, β}
4Boban Arsenijevic (p.c) claims that ‘{{a}} is non-trivial in at least one faculty: the arithmetic ca-
pacity. Hence, output conditions can’t be that bare to favor a binary merge’. However, our position
is that if we assume a strong and dynamic version of Full Interpretation that states that any deriva-
tional step must be interface-justied, that is, the application of any operation must lead to a legible
object the application of Merge to a single object is trivial in any faculty, as it does not contribute in
any way to legibility. If {{a}} is legible for the interface system the arithmetic faculty has to interact
with, then why apply Merge in the rst place, to apply Merge to a single object is trivial in any
faculty. If {a} is already legible in the relevant interface level, then why apply Merge in the rst
place? It would be computationally redundant, and therefore far from Minimalist. We maintain
that binary Merge is a non-trivial option, just that it is not the only option or the simplest for all
cases, contra Chomsky. We therefore reject any proposal of unary Merge on interface grounds.
5As a matter of fact, we have roots semantically defective and procedural features that make
them interpretable at C-I, but we will use the term ‘lexical items’ for the time being. See infra.
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AnalyzeIL {α, β} [is {α, β} fully interpretable by the Interface Level IL? Does
it contain superuous elements?]
(if AnalyzeIL results in legibility at IL, IL coopts the relevant unit and assigns
it an interpretation)
The idea of ‘invasive interfaces’ is a natural result of making interpretat-
ive and generative systems interact within a formal architecture. If generation is
restricted to a single operation concatenate, which is the optimal scenario and it
occurs in an n-dimensional workspace, it is only natural that the operation cannot
read or evaluate what it has built. On the other hand, it is also only natural that
the evaluator function Analyze is not separated from the interfaces but in itself be
the set of so-called Bare Output Conditions (or legibility conditions) each cognit-
ive interface has. Then, if we assume considerations of computational simplicity
like ‘maintain as few structure at once in W as possible’ for a system with nite
resources, that is, ‘transfer as soon as you can’ (and, more generally, ‘apply any
operation as soon as you can’). ‘As soon as you can’ is determined not by internal
syntactic conditions like feature valuation timing (such conditions do not exist
in our proposal), but by the system(s) that use and interpret syntactically derived
cycles. In this way, the generative workspace is nearly emptied several times along
a derivation thus liberating working memory without the concomitant problems
of dening, for example, endocentric transfer domains (i.e., Chomskyan barriers
/ phases). The existence of cycles in PoL derives from the inner dynamics of the
derivation, if structure building is understood as manifold interaction in a metric
space. A cumulative derivation proceeds as syntactic cycles are completed, inter-
sect with other manifolds, and reach a critical dimensionality value that spans the
CMT, squeezing the manifold through a faded dimensional attractor, into a metric
space of lower dimensionality but richer in distance functions. The implement-
ation of a mechanism that can reduce the dimensionality of a manifold once a
critical value is reached within an overall cumulative architecture in which these
lower-dimensional manifolds can be inputs to further operations is one of the main
features of our oscillatory computational dynamics. Carr (2006) denes the CMT as
a way of simplifying otherwise very dicult (or downright unsolvable) problems
involving multiple dimensions in dynamical systems, again, approaching critical
points:
Centre manifold theory [sic] is a rigorous mathematical technique
that makes this [dimensionality] reduction possible, at least near equi-
libria.
In sum, while some properties of complex, n-dimensional complex systems
might be dicult to solve with ordinary dierential equations, solutions in a cen-
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ter manifold can always be described by a nite-dimensional system of such equa-
tions, which is indeed an advantage from both theoretical and empirical perspect-
ives. If we are dealing with cumulative structure building, that can get high-
dimensional very quickly as we add more and more elements to our phrase mark-
ers. The existence of equilibria points, which arise in a spin glass-like frustrated
system like the one that we argue congures the ground state of cognitive dynam-
ics (Saddy 2016; Saddy & Krivochen 2016) guarantees the CMT will apply regularly.
Thus, we don’t really let the cycles grow too big, but we don’t need to stipulate
that ‘every phrase is a phase’ (Epstein & Seely 2002) either.
1.2 What do we derive with? Some notes on architectural issues
We will now explicit the assumptions we make regarding the objects which
the formal operation Concatenation manipulates in natural language derivations.
In our proposal, a derivation does not start with a Numeration (a set of
tokens with numerical subindexes indicating how many times they will be used
in a derivation, see Chomsky 1995; also Uriagereka 2008: 166), but with a pre-
linguistic purely conceptual structure, in the line of Fodor (1975) and, more re-
cently, Jackendo (2002), Culicover & Jackendo (2005), Uriagereka (2008), and
the sense in which D-Structure is understood in the CLASH model (Uriagereka
2012, 2014). That structure is syntactic in a wide sense, as concepts are structured
(taking ‘syntactic’ not in the narrow sense of ‘linguistically structured’ but in a
strict sense of ‘structured’).7 This conceptual structure, shaped by the speaker’s
intention to convey a certain propositional meaning through linguistic means, is
what, in our proposal, drives Select, the selection of a subset of LEX, in turn a set
of lexical types. The assumption we make at this respect is the following:
(10) Minimal Selection: Select the minimal amount of types that can instantiate
6‘[...] he [Chomsky] wants LA to be not a set of lexical types, but rather a set of tokens. [...]
Chomsky wants to identify chains at LF as equivalence relations over the objects in the numeration,
but for that he needs lexical tokens, not types. ’ (Uriagereka 2008: 16)
7Cf. Culicover & Jackendo (2005: 20 fn. 8): ‘Algebraic combinatorial systems are commonly said
to “have a syntax”. In this sense, music has a syntax, computer languages have a syntax, phonology has
a syntax, and so does Conceptual Structure. However, within linguistics, “syntax” is also used to denote
the organization of sentences in terms of categories such as NP, VP, and the like. These categories are
not present in any of the above combinatorial systems, so they are not “syntax” in this narrower sense.
Throughout this book, we use “syntax” exclusively in the narrow sense.’ In this paper, and in general
within our theory, ‘syntax’ is used in the wider sense, for two main reasons: to begin with, there is
no compelling evidence that the ‘syntactic mechanisms’ vary from one system to another (except
insofar as the units aect the algorithm, in case that actually happens); and also, an adequately
wide formalization of syntactic mechanisms could reveal deep facts about the structure of more
than a single system. While Balari & Lorenzo (2013) claim that they belong to a rather extreme
position, namely, that no portion of FL lacks a corresponding part in other cognitive systems, it is
not clear at all why they maintain FL and not directly eliminate FLN/FLB as trivial.
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a conceptual structure CS into a linguistic structure LS losing as few inform-
ation as possible.
The intuition behind this assumption is clear: we want to instantiate a CS
in the most economical way possible8, ceteris paribus. Given the fact that the CS
includes not only rough propositional content but also added information (what
most linguists would put under the ‘pragmatics’ label: inferences, and other extra-
propositional which is, nonetheless, built upon the clues syntactic structure pro-
vides the semantic component with), the reference set for each potential derivation
is unary: there is one and only one candidate which can express CS in an optimal
way (a crash-proof syntax, in the sense of Putnam 2010) with a minimal amount of
entropy per cycle. Assuming the existence of (some form of) a Lexicon for human
language where units to be manipulated are stored, the formal operation Select
builds an array of lexical types from that Lexicon (see Krivochen 2015cfor details
and implementation on a concrete derivation). The overall formal architecture we
assume for language (heavily inspired in Uriagereka’s 2012 CLASH architecture),







The linearization of phrase markers is cyclic (i.e., units are taken by the SM
interface as soon as possible in sub-representations), following the seminal pro-
posal by Uriagereka (1999, 2002b). The long arrow represents the fact that the
8In slightly more technical terms, to be rened below, Selection must reduce entropy, at the cost
of energy necessary to search the phase space for the relevant lexical attractors. If the theory of
stricture building we have developed in past works is correct, the generative algorithm, driven by
interface requirements, should also be ‘counter-entropic’ at each derivational step. David Medeiros
(p.c.) has commented at this respect that ‘My uninformed intuition strongly suggests that, qua
natural system, it should rather maximize entropy. I had read something recently about extend-
ing this to the idea that natural systems tend to maximize future entropy, (which turns out to
make dierent and better predictions in some domains).’ We have had no access to the predictions
Medeiros mentions, but will address the problem by proposing an alternative system, based on
locally counter-entropic structure building.
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derivation is driven by semantic requirements, that is, the need to map the Con-
ceptual Structure CS into a Logical Form LF reducing derivational entropy via Con-
catenation. The orthogonality between the CS-LF arrow and the PF arrows repres-
ent the dynamical frustration (coexistence of mutually incompatible requirements
over the same system) between global semantic requirements and local linearizable
cycles, along the lines of Uriagereka (2012) and Saddy (2016).
As far as the ‘derivational bricks’ are concerned, we assume only two types
of elements in linguistic derivations, all stored in the Lexicon (following Sperber
& Wilson 1995; Wilson & Sperber 2003; and Escandell Vidal & Leonetti 2000, 2004,
2011):
(i) Conceptual elements: i.e., roots, semantically underspecied, malleable
and generic meaning. Roots are pre-categorial linguistic instantiations of a-
categorial generic concepts. Generic concepts are ‘severely underspecied’,
since they are used by many faculties (organizing sensorial information, cre-
ating symbolic representations of the phenomenological world), and there-
fore cannot have any property readable by only some of them. Roots convey
generic conceptual instructions, and their potential extension is maximal
(expressible by the superset that properly contains all referential sets), given
their semantic underspecication: bare roots have no (spatio-temporal) an-
chor.
(ii) Procedural elements: provide instructions as to how to interpret a root
(anchor it to a specic point in Space or Time) or a relation between roots
-including complex structures-. Procedural elements, for expository pur-
poses, can be identied with Functional Categories, but there is a funda-
mental dierence: the procedural character of a node is of no relevance to
syntax, as Concatenate-α, we have said, is blind to the inner characteristics of
the elements it manipulates (that is why it can apply cross-modularly). ‘Pro-
cedurality’ is thus recognized and relevant at the semantic interface, not be-
fore. Following and expanding on Escandell Vidal & Leonetti (2000), we will
identify Determiner, Tense, Cause, Complementizer, and Preposition as pro-
cedural elements. The instructions conveyed by procedural elements play
two main roles:
• Restrict reference in terms of a (nite) proper subset of the root. Each
element restricts the set of the root’s intensional characteristics in dif-
ferent ways. For example, for X and Y procedural elements:
√= {α, β, γ, δ...n}9
(X, √) = {α, δ}
9Bare roots have maximal extension, in the following sense: the bare root √APPLE denotes all
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(Y, √) = {β, γ}
• Provide instructions as to:
– where to retrieve information? (i.e., considering the mind to be
massively modular, in which module should the parser look for
the relevant information?)
– what kind of information to retrieve? (i.e., eventive, sortal, caus-
ative, locative...?)
Therefore, procedural elements convey locative meaning in the sense that they
relate a gure (i.e., the root) to a ground (a set of intensional properties), and they
are thus predicators (i.e, functors).10
Formally, we have the following situation in the case of a lexical item LI:
(12) A lexical item LI is a structure {X...α...√} ∈W, where X is a procedural cat-
egory (Determiner, Time, Preposition) specied enough as regards distri-
bution, α is an n number of non-intervenient nodes for category recogni-
tion purposes at the semantic interface, √is a root and W an n-dimensional
workspace.
Now, we will not assume a monolithic Lexicon, as in orthodox versions of the
Minimalist Program, but work with the concept of type-Array. In such an Array,
the apples in the Universe that have existed, that exist, that will exist and also those that exist in
non-factual possible worlds. In this sense, procedural elements restricting such maximal extension
become indispensable for manipulation when Bare roots have maximal extension, in the following
sense: the bare root √APPLE denotes all the apples in the Universe that have existed, that exist,
that will exist and also those that exist in non-factual possible worlds. In this sense, procedural ele-
ments restricting such maximal extension become indispensable for manipulation when deriving
semantic representations (i.e., Logical Forms). It is because of this maximal extension, also, that
bare roots cannot be manipulated by C-I, which aects the label recognition algorithm.
10Consider, for instance, the formalization of the meaning of the prepositions ‘inside’ and ‘out-
side’ in terms of polar coordinates (Zwarts & Gärdenfors 2016: 11), for x = distance between a
trajector (a.k.a. gure, see Zwarts 2003) and the space of a landmark (a.k.a., ground) S(L); θ = angle
between the trajector and the x-axis; φ = angle between the trajector and the positive z-axis; and
rL is the radius of the landmark L:
(i) inside(L) = {〈x, θ, φ〉 ∈ S(L) : x 6 rL}
(ii) outside(L) = {〈x, θ, φ〉 ∈ S(L) : x > rL}
Since landmarks are assumed to be circles in this work, if the linguistic space (as opposed to the
ground state of cognitive dynamics) was ultrametric, then every point would be at a distance x = r,
neither inside nor outside S(L), or, rather, if x = 0, every point would be the origo. Importantly for
a topologically based theory, the semantics of prepositions (and, more generally, localist theories
of cognition) thus requires metricity. See, however, Roberts (2015) for an ultrametric approach to
X-bar structure.
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there are no numeric subindexes indicating how many times a unit is to be used
in a derivation (as in Chomsky’s proposal), nor phonological features or formal
features: there are just types to be instantiated as tokens in a derivation according
to interface requirements. There is no a priori limit to the number of times a type
can be instantiated as a token, but those established by C-I interface conditions,
particularly Conservation of conceptual information (Lasnik et al. 2005; Krivochen
2011, 2015c).
Let us assume that we have an Array consisting on a root and a procedural
node D(eterminer). Assuming, along orthodox lines, that the identifying label of
the structure {α, β} must be either α or β (which seems to be the simplest option,
as it does not include a new element in the derivation) for the purposes of fur-
ther computations and interface recognition, the derivation could go either of the
following ways (14) or (15):
(13) Concatenate (√, D) = {√, D}
(14) Label {√, D} = {√, {√, D}}
Or
(15) Label {√, D} = {D, {√, D}}
(15) seems prima facie to collapse at the semantic interface. However, is it
possible to derive this from interface conditions without appealing to additional
assumptions, for example, Distributed Morphology’s Categorization Assumption
(see Embick & Noyer 2007 for developments of the claim that bare roots are not
interpretable at the interfaces)? In our model, in the line of Panagiotidis 2009a,
roots are way too semantically underspecied to undergo referent assignment, and
thus an explicature (i.e., a full propositional form with satised referential vari-
ables, see Sperber & Wilson 1995; Wilson & Sperber 2004) cannot be built. On
the other hand, if we let D be the ‘label’ at the semantic interpretative compon-
ent, the whole structure is interpreted as a specied entity, because of the rigidity
of D’s procedural instructions: conceptual content can be narrowed or widened11,
but procedural content cannot (Escandell Vidal & Leonetti 2011). ‘Ill-formations’,
therefore, are interface-determined; the structure building operation has nothing
to do with them (thus, labelling proposals which follow from a narrowly syntactic
operation like Minimal Search – e.g., Chomsky 2015 – turn out to be problematic).
Let us consider a more extreme case:
(16) Concatenate (D, T) = {D, T} (T = Tense)
11For example, the extension of √BANK can be widened to include ATMs as well as nancial
institutions on the one hand, and narrowed to specify a small-scale bank instead of the World
Bank.
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(17) Label {D, T} = {D, {D, T}} / {T, {D, T}}
Neither alternative yields a usable object, as it is to be expected. There is
no way of building an explicature out of that structure, no matter how C-I tries to
interpret it, assuming that every input conveys the assumption of its own Optimal
Relevance: there is no substance to delimit, no maximal extension to restrict. The
phase space for this system is not unrestricted (as would be the case with a root
without a procedural category): there is no phase space at all (conceivably, the vec-
tor components of each category cancel each other out, since one conveys sortality,
and the other anchors an event). Optimal Relevance cannot possibly be achieved, in
other words. It is obvious as well that there is nothing wrong with {D, T} in strictly
formal terms, given Concatenate-α. Any restrictions are interface-imposed.
Let us make some further clarications on our notion of Type-Array and
Token-Merge:
(18) A type is a (possibly unary) set of points in vector space12 (thus, a phrase
marker is an orientable manifold in vector space, see Saddy 2016 for dis-
cussion).
(19) A token is an occurrence of a type within an active workspace WX. There
are no a priori limits to the times a type can be instantiated as a token but
those required by Interface Conditions IC.
The number of tokens required is determined by interface conditions, so that
the minimal number of tokens leading to a convergent (i.e., fully interpretable) ob-
ject is used, provided that the notion of ‘convergent object’ does not arise from look
ahead (the syntactic component looking at the legibility conditions of the interface
systems, which would lead us to a ‘bad’ crash-proof system), but rather from the
interfaces ‘peering into’ (i.e., ‘invading’) the syntactic workspace (something sim-
ilar to the proposal in Boeckx 2007, although the consequences drawn there are
12We briey address an interesting issue raised by Thomas Stroik (p.c.) here: how come, if
language is indeed a physical system, as we claim, that there are types and tokens, or blind Merge,
something that is not found in other physical systems or processes (say, for example, the formation
of a complex molecule)? Two aspects of the question are to be considered: on the one hand, our
main thesis is that all physical systems are identical ‘at a principled level of abstraction’, not at a
substantive level. By ‘principled level’, as we have argued in previous works, we mean architectural
issues, particularly as it comes to complexity. Therefore, we argue that any kind of ‘complexity’ can
be studied formally as an interpretative epiphenomenon of the interaction between simpler units,
until getting to the unit that integrates another but is itself not composed by any other. On the other
hand, and relatedly, the formation of a complex molecule is indeed limited by the characteristics
of the units that are manipulated, that is, chemistry is not crash-rife, and there are compounds
that are either unstable or directly do not appear under natural conditions. That is not due to a
property of the union (e.g., covalent, ionic, metallic), but of the elements involved. Contrarily to
endoskeletal models (GB, Minimalism, HPSG, LFG), it is not the properties of lexical entries that
determine the shape of the syntactic conguration, but semantic interface requirements.
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completely dierent from ours) and Analyzing whether a syntactic object is ready
to be transferred. Boeckx (2010b) points out, and we agree, that feature bundles
cannot be driving syntax, since these bundles are structures and that structure is
(must be) syntactic in very much the road taken by Distributed Morphology (Halle
& Marantz 1993; Embick & Noyer 2007, and much related work), where it is con-
sidered that roots and ‘f-morphemes’ (functional elements like inectional morph-
emes and categorizers, to use the old DM term) are combined syntactically, with
the same constraints that apply to a phrasal syntactic representation. The elements
the syntax manipulates should optimally be atomic, and Merge should be taken, in
his view, as a free-triggered unbounded operation, Merge-α. The whole argument-
ation of Boeckx’s (2010b) aims at ‘defeating lexicocentrism’, that is, the presence
of a pre-syntactic instance where fully-edged lexical items are taken from. Con-
trarily to Chomsky (2005)and Hauser et al. (2002), the ‘great leap forward’ (that is,
the qualitative evolutionary dierence between humans and non-humans which
would have made language available) in the present proposal would be the inter-
action between an n-ary concatenative formal operation, freely available throughout
the mind, and sound-meaning systems, but not the concatenative operation itself.
This interaction yields a dynamically frustrated complex system, for the require-
ments of sound and meaning systems are mutually orthogonal (Uriagereka 2012,
2014). This perspective might set the agenda for an alternative biolinguistic kind
of inquiry: interesting dynamics arise when we limit the power of an algorithm or
the probability amplitudes in a phase space, rather than enrich those.
We have so far sketched the framework that will lead our inquiry, whose
main claim is that language is an object with no particular idiosyncrasy within the
natural world: it is, as any other portion of the Universe, a physical system in the
technical sense. We consider language to be a physical system, and we charac-
terize it using non-linear dynamics: this means that, as we said above, interface
representations are not a direct function of the input to the derivation. Some basic
properties of these systems are listed below (based on Hasselblat & Katok 2003;
Ladyman et al. 2012; Baranger 2004; Boccara 2002):
(20) a. Open to external inuence
b. Complex (i.e., contain subsystems)
c. Dynamic (i.e., change over time)
d. Emergence (i.e., the collective behaviour of the system is not a linear
function of the behaviour of its individual components)
e. Nesting / hierarchical organization
f. Existence of feedback loops
We assume that the cognitive systems exhibit the same phenomena as phys-
ical properties in (20).
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Natural languages, as also pointed out by Saddy (2016) seem to fulll all of
the intensional requirements in (20): they are open because interface constraints
to apply to an output13 are not abstracted by a mind unless in contact with data
in the phenomenological world (so-called Primary Linguistic Data), and it is also a
methodological mistake to study language in the mind-brain completely isolated
from other systems insofar as those systems impose conditions upon language
design: we are referring to physical limitations on possible neural networks (see
Uriagereka 1998; Cherniak 2009), in turn deeply related to optimization algorithms;
they are complex because syntax (the generative component widely understood) in-
terfaces with other two components of interpretative nature and natural language
comprises all three (Faculty of Language in the Broad sense, in Hauser et al. 2002),
in fact, we argue that all that there is to the specicity of language is the inter-
face of these systems, in turn deeply related to the property of emergence; they
are dynamic in two relevant ways: rstly (and from an ontogenetic point of view),
because the number of constraints that apply to the output of the generative com-
ponent changes over time during acquisition, as they are subsumed to other, more
fundamental constraints until reaching the optimal scenario: a crash-proof sys-
tem with only one constraint. A caveat is in order here: the more constraints we
have, the more stable the system will be: after a certain number of constraints, a
‘threshold’, the change is suddenly perfectly ordered and predictable. If we have
only few constraints, the result will be a system tending to innite complexity in-
stead of achieving internal balance after a certain period of time. In the end, we
cannot fully dispense with constraints upon the output of the generative compon-
ent: from our perspective, it is precisely the interplay between these constraints
which are mutually incompatible (global for semantics, local for morphophono-
logy) which dene a dynamical frustration that shapes the formal and substantive
properties of language as a system (including the presence of Zipan distributions,
since they arise from the tension between Forces of Diversication and Unica-
tion, see Zipf 1949), including its neurobiological substratum (Hansel et al. 1995;
Papo et al. 2014). In Krivochen (in progress), we argue that the processing of lan-
guage, because of its structural characteristics, is not the computation of a function
(contra Gallistel & King 2010), which transform a nite input into a nite output
in polynomial time by means of a closed process involving serial applications of
rules or operations. We claim that natural language processing makes use of open
processes, and multiple (though nite) inputs, impossible to calculate or foresee
a priori, interacting with outputs to generate representations of the structure and
meaning of a linguistic stimulus.
The scenario we have sketched so far, then, consists on a free generator, in
13Whenever we talk about constraints, we have in mind an OT-like architecture, and the deni-
tion of constraint that follows from that architecture.
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the sense that it is not constrained by intra-syntactic lters, and a set of constraints
over usable outputs. The application of an extremely local evaluation procedure
gives meta-stable balance to the system, what is normally called ‘negative feed-
back’: after an external perturbation in the cognitive system, it balances itself,
thus getting to one of several possible meta-stable states (a property of spin glass
congurations), which we are interested in analyzing.
As an independent hypothesis from nonlinearity, we will now address the
question whether language is a chaotic system. It is essential to bear in mind that,
while both chaos theory and complexity theory study non-linear dynamics, they
are not to be identied, nor do they use the same tools for analysis: in this par-
ticular case, we argue that the emergent behavior is the result of the non-linear –
syntactic – interaction between a nite number of elements, optimally, only un-
derspecied roots (possibly very few per language) and procedural elements (P,
T, C, v, D), combined syntactically; taking into account the legibility conditions
of the interpretative systems the computational system interfaces with (C-I and
S-M; meaning and sound), the result of the syntactic computation is only partly
deterministic (not random, but not entirely deterministic either, as we argue in
Krivochen in progress, where we make a case against seeing linguistic derivations
as functions in the traditional Church/Turing-relevant sense). Given this scenario,
we will ask ‘is language a chaotic system?’
2 Language as a chaotic system?
We will propose in this paper is that natural language is indeed a non-linear
chaotic system in the technical sense of the expression (which, in turn, has far-
reaching consequences for a theory of the mind in which this system is imple-
mented, as we will see below). Our discussion, even though related to that in
Uriagereka (1998, 2000, 2002a) and Saddy & Uriagereka (2004), as has been poin-
ted out to us, has somewhat dierent foundations and consequences: we are not
so much concerned with aspects of the narrow syntax, but set our focus on more
general properties of physical systems, which happen to surface in language.
Since Uriagereka’s aforementioned articles have been pointed to us to be
the rst application of aspects of chaos theory and entropy to language within a
generative framework, they deserve some comments as our proposal diers from
his.
Uriagereka assumes the following tenets (2000: 865):
(21) Within local derivational horizons, derivations take those steps which max-
imize further convergent derivational options.
(22) All else being equal, derivations involving fewest steps outrank their altern-
atives.
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We nd some problems with these assumptions and their theoretical con-
sequences, acknowledging that the framework was devised with the tools in hand
at that point. To begin with, the concept of local derivational horizons is left un-
dened. To our knowledge, two options arise in the current state of the art in
linguistics:
(i) Chomskyan endocentric phases, that is, local derivational units headed by a
certain kind of linguistic element and dened a priori (Chomsky 1998, 2008,
2015);
(ii) each application of a structure-building algorithm determines a local deriv-
ational unit (Epstein & Seely 2002).
In any case, this is problematic, since not only the identity of the local do-
mains is unknown, but also where they are dened (at the ‘narrow syntax’? At the
interfaces?). In our present proposal, derivational cycles can be dened from two
perspectives:
(i) Computationally, as maximal-minimal nite-state compatible units for pur-
poses of structure linearization (Uriagereka 2002b, 2012).
(ii) Informationally, as sub-domains of locally decreasing entropy in a discon-
tinuous oscillatory function.
A feature that is common to Uriagereka’s (2002b, 2012) approach and our
own is that cycles are minimally interpretable, maximally generable units. This,
which might seem a mere aphorism, is a way of summarizing what a cycle is
and how (and why) it arises, given a system with generative-interpretative dy-
namics. Cycles are minimally interpretable units because nothing smaller than a
cycle can be assigned an interpretation in terms of sortality, eventivity, or relations
between them. And, they are maximally generable, because once a critical value
for the manifold being generated is reached, a dimensional attractor fades due to
the inherent limitations of the physical system we’re dealing with, and no further
structure can be built up in that derivational current (Saddy 2016; Krivochen in
progress). Given oscillatory dynamics subjected to the CMT of the kind we have
presented here, a dynamically frustrated physical system with nite resources can-
not hold on to a transferrable object. Unlike Chomskyan cycles (barriers, phases
...), which arise from theory-internal stipulations over both structure building and
labeling (such that only certain nonterminal nodes congure phases), cycles in
the two senses above are much more fundamental – since they arise from com-
putational and physical properties of the system, respectively – and dynamical –
insofar as we cannot say, a priori, whether a syntactic object is a cycle or not, as it
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depends on the legibility conditions of the systems that are supposed to read that
object.
Uriagereka’s tenet given in (22) is particularly conictive from a contem-
porary theoretical perspective as it overtly builds on Chomsky’s (1995) seminal
proposal about reference sets to compare derivations (see also Müller 2011 for dis-
cussion about transderivational constraints). Uriagereka, like Chomsky, assumes
the existence of a set R = {D1, D2...Dn}, where D are derivations, each built by taking
‘decisions’ about structure-building that, in turn, allow dierent possibilities al-
ways departing from the same set of lexical types. Derivations can be compared, in
this system, with respect to the number of possibilities each derivational decision
(e.g., Merge / Move) allows. According to Uriagereka, if an operationΣ allows an n
number of continuations and an operation Σ’ allows a number m of continuations,
if m < n, then Σincreases derivational entropy and Σ’ is to be preferred. Problems
with this approach arise from the very beginning of the argumentation. To begin
with, the system is syntactically based and centered, with the interpretative sound
/ meaning interfaces playing no role at all in determining cost / ‘derivational en-
tropy’, in consonance with a strongly constructivist system which needs syntax to
be partly interpretative in order to read previous derivational steps and, what is
more, allow massive look ahead so that all possibilities have to be fully derived to
be compared. In our opinion, this does not imply any optimization of the mechan-
ism but, on the contrary, overloads the computation as there is no a priori way of
limiting, say, m: derivations could be completely random, which undermines both
the computational and implementational value of the theory. In theory, m could
be innite, as there is no element in the Lexical Array that necessarily conveys an
instruction to end the derivation (i.e., there is no ‘halting rule’), and no halting al-
gorithm has been proposed within generativism beyond stipulations about phase
heads (v*, C in Chomsky’s approach, see also Gallego 2010) and transfer of phase
head complements.
Returning to the ground problem of reference sets, a crash-proof model like
that argued for in Putnam (2010); Stroik & Putnam (2013), and Krivochen & Kosta
(2013) has a reference set that is for all intents and purposes unary: in the terms we
have introduced here, the system generates (i.e., derives) symbolic representations
dened in vector spaces, the relation between sub-phrase markers as orientable
manifolds denes an optimal derivation dened by the core vector components
of each manifold involved, with peripheral vector components largely cancelling
each other out (Feynman et al. 2005). In our proposal, like in Survive Minimal-
ism (Putnam 2007; Stroik 2009; Stroik & Putnam 2013), there is no point in talking
about competing derivations or degrees of optimality in the early Minimalist sense
(see Müller 2011): if a symbolic representation is coopted by the interfaces, it is as
optimal as it can be given certain external conditions, something that has a very
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close parallel in biological and physical systems, and optimization problems (nd-
ing the best from all feasible solutions, see Boyd & Vandenberghe 2004): it is not
perfection, but optimality, that counts. In this respect, it is interesting to explore
the relation between the non-function approach to Array-(PF, LF) pairs and the
sensitive to initial conditions that characterize chaotic systems (see, e.g., Smith
1998): consider that the nth step of a derivation is characterized by the values of
x variables (call them lexical elements, including both roots and procedural ele-
ments), those values being, e.g., category, case, etc. (what is usually referred to
as ‘features’ of an element, even outside the feature-valuation approach). What
we say is that the derivational stage n + 1 is neither a linear function of n (thus, a
linguistic derivation cannot be characterized by means of recurrence relations) nor
a function of the Numeration, since unless additional stipulations and restrictions
enter the game, it is not possible to have a fully deterministic path from Num to
(PF, LF): for instance, the same Num can give rise to more than one convergent
derivation:
(23) Array: {who, know, v, T, C, believe, Bob}
a. Who knows who believes Bob?
b. Who knows who Bob believes?
c. Who believes who Bob knows?
d. Who believes who knows Bob?
...plus a huge number of non-convergent derivations, gibberish, and mar-
ginal sentences (e.g., Bob believes who knows who?, only acceptable as an echo
question). Having a single starting point, there are multiple possible endings, not
all of which are (PF, LF) convergent, and, most importantly, mainstream Minimal-
ism has, to the best of our knowledge, no way to make a derivation fully determin-
istic, nor can all properties of a sentence / utterance be present in the Numeration:
there is place for emergence and chaos in linguistic derivations. A theory of real-
time development of linguistic derivations should, we argue, include the analogue
of a system of dynamical equations, which capture the development of the values
of the variables in time (e.g., specify the mechanisms via which category and case
are ‘assigned’ to a lexical item at the interfaces), while impoverishing the narrow
syntax itself to a mere concatenative engine. This move would help extending
the limits of syntactic theorizing beyond natural language into other areas of in-
terest, like music and mathematics. The property of nesting, which is, as we have
seen, one of the characteristics of complex systems, is also a signature of so-called
‘chaos in space’ (Baranger 2004: 4-5), i.e., fractal structures. Memory limitations
aside, the possibilities of structure nesting in natural language are innitely many,
insofar as even assuming a limited alphabet of symbols to work with (at any given
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point, the lexicon of a natural language is nitely enumerable, even if new ele-
ments can in principle be added to it): as has been noticed by Uriagereka (1998),
among others, the structure of natural language is that of a fractal, with dierent
levels of complexity (a property that has been recognized since pre-structuralism,
as ‘double articulation’). The question here is whether we are dealing with a self-
similar fractal or not: that is, do successive ‘enlargments’ of a syntactic structure
reproduce always the same object? In this respect, it is possible that we are in
presence of self-similar structure to dierent degrees (a ‘quasi-fractal’, see Mandel-
brot 1983), given a mixed computational system of the kind explored in Krivochen
(2015a), and Bravo et al. (2015). Needless to say, a deeper research on the nature of
the external conditions imposed over syntactic structure by the interface systems
is crucial here, insofar as dierent system requirements might result in dierent
kind of fractal structures (thus, the kind of structural complexity to be found in nat-
ural language is not the same as that to be found in mathematical thought): this is,
we think, both a theoretical and an empirical challenge, for the regularities in the
structure of the system could be based (as we argue) on deeper physical principles
of matter organization, in turn aecting the possibilities for neural network con-
nections and their computational emergent properties. The tension (‘frustration’)
between n -dimensional semantic structures, and Markovian phonological strings
(Uriagereka 2012; Krivochen 2015a, 2015c; Idsardi & Raimy in press ) congures
an oscillatory ‘stretching and folding’ pattern characteristic of non-linear chaotic
dynamics (see, e.g., Baranger 2004: 8; Saddy & Uriagereka 2004; Saddy 2016), in
which chunks of structure are dynamically attened to be externalized (Lasnik and
Uriagereka 2012: 21), a dynamics that can be captured by an oscillatory function
with a period determined by semantic conditions (see Uriagereka 2002b for a model
of Multiple Spell-Out based on phonological requirements, and Krivochen 2015a,
2015c, in progress for a complementary model based on semantic domains rather
than phonologically linearizable structural chunks).
A dening property of complex chaotic systems is entropy, given by their dy-
namic character: the development of a system (ontogenetically, the mental gram-
mar; but we are concerned with a local, derivational point of view) leads to an
inevitable increase of its entropy, in the system we are interested in, from the con-
ceptual structure CS shaping a speaker’s intention to the ultimate materialization
/ externalization of that intention as a linguistic stimulus. Let us provide a rst
naïve approximation of the concept of entropy:
(24) Entropy is a measure for disorder.
Whereas (24) is uncontroversial in modern physics, it is also of little inform-
ative value: we still do not have a denition of ‘disorder’ (or even of ‘order’, for that
matter), and we lack also a circumscribed eld for the denition to be scientically
useful. Let us enrich the denition, then:
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(25) Entropy is the measure of the free energy that is released and cannot be used
in a changing physical system, provided that the system is free and in normal
temperature.
Within information theory – and on a background of Markov models – Shan-
non (1948: Appendix 2), based on Boltzmann’s H theorem, formally dened the
entropy H of a discrete random variable x (with possible values {x1, ..., xn}) and
probability mass function pi (i.e., the probability that the random variable is in a





This is a denition that is both general enough to be applied to dierent
physical systems (as long as there is information involved) and specic enough so
that it is scientically interesting. We will work under the hypothesis that the
aforementioned informal denition (25) is valid for every physical system, and,
since biological systems are particular instantiations of physical systems, they are
also analyzable from an entropic perspective.15 We claim that biological systems are
particular instantiations of physical possibilities since, for example, neurological
optimization (‘non-genomic nativism’, Cherniak 2009) is restricted to the possibil-
ities licensed by the physical organization of matter and the congurations it can
adopt with basis on the physical laws that rule the phenomenological world. There
is already a considerable amount of work within Biological Physics regarding the
concept of entropy in biological systems (e.g., Udgaonkar 2001), but we will try
to give another turn to the screw by analyzing entropy in linguistic derivational
procedures, taking ‘derivation’ in a wide sense to be the successive application of
the generative operation concatenate-α, limiting ourselves to natural language for
methodological (and space) reasons. Let us formulate the hypothesis we will work
with in the course of the paper:
(27) Language is a chaotic complex nonlinear system.
This rst formulation will do for the time being. Let us see how the system
would work.
14It is to be noticed that Shannon provides formulae for more than one variable, H(x, y). In these
cases, x is the information source and y is the destination. We will not go deeper into this here,
but refer the reader to Shannon (1948) for details.
15That is, the characteristics a biological system can adopt are constrained by the physical prin-
ciples ruling the environment in which that biological system is to develop. Udgaonkar (2001)
is a brief and good introduction to some problems of physical biology. Uriagereka (1998: ch. 1)
also expresses some of these ideas, but in a more introductory way for those not familiar with the
assumptions of generative biolinguistics.




Language, chaos and entropy: A physical take on biolinguistics
Diego Gabriel Krivochen
3 Entropy in linguistic derivations
A derivation will be taken here to be a successive application of an algorithm,
with no necessity that the output of that computation is a function of the input
(see Goldin & Wegner 2005, 2007; Krivochen in progress, for discussion of the
consequences this corollary has for the applicability of the Church/Turing thesis).
In more concrete terms, a derivation as seen from a mechanistic perspective is
the nite set S containing the objects created by the successive application of the
concatenation function we dened in (3), and which we repeat here:
(28) Concatenation denes a chain of coordinates in n-dimensional metric work-
spaces W of the form (x, y, z ... n) ⊂WX, ... (x, y, z ... n) ⊂WY, ... (x, y, z ...
n) ⊂Wn.
To provide the derivation of an object means to provide an account of the
history of how that object came to be, given an input and a computational proced-
ure, plus the conditions the output is to meet (in our case, sound-meaning interface
conditions). Nothing impedes that concatenation as a purely formal operation ap-
plies indenitely, which gives us innite use of nite media, in Humboldt’s terms.
However, when an object derived via concatenation has to be interpreted by an in-
terface system (which is not the case in arithmetic, for example), the derivation is
driven by a principle we have dubbed Dynamic Full Interpretation, a step-by-step
application of Brody’s (1995) Radical Interpretation:
(29) Dynamic (Full) Interpretation: Any derivational step is justied only
insofar as it increases the information and/or it generates an interpretable
object.
Let us see what this thesis means for the entropy of derivations. If entropy
reaches its maximum level when all elements are equally likely to enter the active
workspace, any restriction regarding the set of elements that can be merged in the
following derivational step (see the denition of ‘Soft crash’ in Putnam 2010: 6),
which includes this notion of local derivational unit) will make entropy decrease,
since the system is asymptotically tending towards an ordered state. Let us see an
example. A linguistic derivation starts when some items are drawn from the Lex-
icon, the full set of conceptual and procedural elements represented in a speaker’s
mind. Those items are types, and each of their instantiations in a derivation is
a token. The rst step in a derivation, then, is to form a type-array, containing
types of all the elements that will be used to generate a sentence as faithful to
the CS as possible. From a PoL perspective, each of these elements is a perturba-
tion of the ground state of cognitive dynamics, which is argued in Saddy (2016),
Saddy & Krivochen (2016), and Krivochen (in progress) to be an unrestricted, high-
dimensional ultrametric space. Let us work with the following array:
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(30) Type-Array = {D, P, √α, √β}
These perturbations cannot be related on an ultrametric space because of
the topological properties of this space; usable outputs require the ultrametricity
of the space to be disrupted. In order for the information held by this space to be
put to use we need to translate critical properties of the complex manifolds into a
lower dimensional and metric instantiation of this space. Saddy (2016) argues that
This initial space, uncountable in nature (i.e., qua set of points, its car-
dinality is greater than ℵ), gives us a very rich representation in terms
of the organization of the sensoria, but since this space is unrestricted
we cannot do anything with it: there is nothing that is not in there.
In slightly more technical terms, there is no point in this unrestricted
space that does not have a probability amplitude associated with it. This
space has no hard conditions imposed upon it, which allows for very rich
and high-dimensional representations –multidimensional complexman-
ifolds – but also leaves us with no way to limit the phase space: there is
no grammar that can generate such a space
That is we need a dynamic process that will project or translate information
from the ultrametric space into a metric space that is mediated by strict topological
and computational conditions. Given an unrestricted high-dimensional ultramet-
ric space of the kind we mentioned above, there will be an innite number of
n-dimensional manifolds which represent dimensional surfaces and, provided the
topology of the space is disrupted – as from external input – they may intersect
and reach a critical dimensionality value, thus triggering the CMT.
Given the type-array in (30) and no further stipulations, any of these ele-
ments could enter the workspace W rst, so the rst step in a derivation has the
maximum entropy. In Krivochen (in progress) we present a way to model a de-
rivation in terms of paths within a vector space which minimize the associated
Lagrangian, here we will present the problem in slightly more classical (generat-
ive) terms. Let us assume √α enters the derivation rst, as would be expected in a
2-D tree-like representation16, but completely irrelevant in an n-dimensional phase
space studied from a eld-theoretical perspective. The introduction of an element
in the phase space makes the entropy associated with that space decrease, since
not all elements in the initial Array may enter the derivational space and undergo
concatenation with √α while respecting DFI. Depending on the conceptual struc-
ture that this syntactic derivation is to instantiate, the possibilities for P vary, but
16See Di Sciullo & Isac (2008), Stroik & Putnam (2013), De Belder & van Craenenbroeck (2011)
for examples of dierent criteria to determine which element enters the syntactic workspace rst.
All of the references assume some kind of featural defectivity in the element, an assumption we do
not share.
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assume for the sake of the argument that we want to build a fully-edged prepos-
itional phrase, containing two Determiner Phrases = {D, √} constructions related
in a central / terminal coincidence manner by means of P (preposition). If this is
the case, the possibilities for P = 0, since the conceptual structure requires sortal
entities; and the possibilities for √β= 0 as well since roots are semantically under-
specied and cannot be interpreted by C-I unless within a larger structure contain-
ing a procedural element that indicates the semantic interface how to manipulate
the semantic content conveyed by the root. This means that we have an optimal
situation: only one type-candidate satises DFI. The following derivational step
would be:
(31) Concatenate (√α, D) = {√α, D}
Notice that should we have introduced D rst, the results would have been
the same since generation does not care about order or ‘side’ of the tree in which
symbols are inserted, unless one is willing to concede that the computational sys-
tem is both generative and interpretative. If such a comment applies to traditional
Kaynean trees (of the kind generated by the development of an L-grammar, as
shown in detail in Uriagereka 2012), it sure does to symbolic structures beyond
Turing computability, as it might be the case of conceptual structures and, within
language, probably multidominance theories of displacement. For the purposes of
future computations, this structure will be interpreted as a D(eterminer), this is
what we call the label of the construction (otherwise, no information would have
been added strictly speaking since the whole structure would still be interpreted
as an underspecied root). Having thus a {D, √} structure, the situation changes:
even though merging another D token is not possible if DFI is to be satised, we
still have, in principle, three logically possible candidates, all equally likely to be
instantiated as tokens in the derivation. This increases the entropy again and,
if we had no way to determine what must come next, the derivation could not
continue. In previous sections we have argued in favor of a pre-linguistic concep-
tual structure very much on the line of Jackendo (1987, 1990, 2002), Culicover &
Jackendo 2005, Uriagereka (2012, 2014), that is instantiated linguistically via the
Conservation Principle17 (hereafter, ConsP):
17Lasnik et al. (2005) borrow Conservation Principle from physics, and state the following law:
(i) 1st Conservation Law: All information in a syntactic derivation comes from the lexicon and
interpretable lexical information cannot be destroyed.
The problem we nd with this law is that it makes use of lexical information taken from a pre-
syntactic and monolithic lexicon, which is the norm in orthodox Minimalism, but with which we
will not work. Moreover, this formulation is limited to linguistic structures, whereas ours is wider
in scope.
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(32) Conservation Principle: information cannot be eliminated in the course of
a derivation, but it must be instantiated in the relevant system in such a way
that it can be read and it is fully preserved.
If this pre-linguistic conceptual structure was locative, then a {{D}, {P, {D}}}
construction is to be built in W. However, we can also derive the better candidate
from purely post-syntactic interface conditions, which is another (perhaps less
controversial) option. Assuming Brody’s (1995) Radical Interpretation Thesis, every
element must receive an interpretation (strengthening the hypothesis, not in some
syntactic location, but in every syntactic location in which it appears at LF) and,
we will add, if the element conveys procedural instructions as to how to relate
conceptual elements, this information must be represented syntactically, so as not
to lose information (and therefore incur in a violation of the ConsP). We have
{P} in the Type-Array, which conveys locative procedural instructions, in terms of
central-terminal coincidence relation between a Figure and a Ground; see Talmy
(1983, 2000); Hale & Keyser (1993, 2002); Mateu Fontanals (2002). If we introduce
any other token into the derivation the procedural information conveyed by {P}
will be lost since there will be no available instruction to relate two structures,
typically of the type {D, √}, at the semantic interface: any other element, even
though procedural, would not be relational, and the information conveyed by the
CS would be modied. So, the ConsP favors the introduction of a {P} token in
W. This way, the derivation continues with variable levels of entropy, basically
responding to the following dynamics: in a Cartesian system, for x = derivational
steps (i.e., applications of concatenation), and entropy represented in the y axis
such that 0 = complete order and 1 = complete disorder, the oscillatory dynamics
of the system tends asymptotically towards 1 and 0 alternatively as structure is
built and the relevant phase space for interpreting that structure is progressively
restricted (see Saddy 2016; Uriagereka 2011 for related views). Once a syntactic
object is recognized by the relevant interface as complete (i.e., fully interpretable),
what we will call a ‘cycle’, global entropy goes up again.
We see that derivational entropy is reduced at the cost of energy required
to disrupt the ultrametricity of the ground state of cognitive dynamics and make
manifolds intersect, but this is so only within a local domain, where locality is
dened according to interface conditions and by no means as an a priori concept.
A local domain is a minimal interpretative unit which is also maximally generable
insofar as its growth triggers the CMT at a critical dimensionality value (as pro-
posed in Saddy 2016 and Krivochen in progress). This oscillatory system has the
advantage of dening domains dynamically and in real time and without resort-
ing to narrowly syntactic stipulations; because of this, the CMT-based denition of
cycle is also system-neutral. Assume that new domains so dened above are cre-
ated starting from separate (sequential or parallel, since there is no a priori limit to
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the number of W that can be activated simultaneously) Type-Arrays: each time a
new (interface-delimited) domain is built, the entropy value is maximum again since
all elements are equally probable. This means we have to consider entropy dynam-
ics at two scales: global and local. Global entropy would be the specic value for
a domain d, whereas local entropy is the value of entropy at every point in the
derivation (a rough equivalent to harmonic serialism in OT-like models of syntax,
see, e.g., McCarthy 2010). This interplay of scales denes a dynamical frustration
of a specic kind, a scale frustration (Binder 2008).
3.1 Some local properties of derivations
In our derivational model we dierentiate, following Uriagereka (1999,
2002a), monotonic and non-monotonic structures, since they have dierent com-
putational properties and thus impact dierently on the size of cycles. Monotonic
concatenation refers to the application of the generative function in a successive
way involving always a terminal node:
(33)





We see that the third step involves the inclusion of a terminal (i.e., non-
branching node) γ which is merged with a non-terminal, {α, β}, and the same
happens in the fourth step, where φ is merged to a non-terminal {γ, {α, β}}. The
mechanism represented in (33) exemplies this kind of application of the gener-
ative algorithm, which is referred to as monotonic. Non-monotonic merge involves






In (34) we see that the second step involves the merger of two non-terminals,
giving rise to a complex object. Each non-terminal, in turn, has been assembled
monotonically in a separate workspace, and the unication takes place in a third
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workspace (in our proposal) or at the interfaces (in Uriagereka’s). We will main-
tain the ‘multiple parallel workspaces’ mechanic here, since not only the syntactic
component can be simplied with it, but also the semantic component C-I appears
to be able to handle several representations in parallel when deriving pragmatic
inferences (Wilson & Sperber 2003). The availability of parallel syntactic work-
spaces has also been justied within the PoL approach from a mathematical point
of view. In our formal denition of concatenation we introduced the concept of
n-dimensional workspace. As a reminder, W is an n-dimensional generative work-
space. Considering two distinct workspaces WX and WY, we nd one of three
formal scenarios:
(35) a. WX ≡WY i ∀(x) | x ∈WX, x ∈WY ∧ @(x), x ∈WX, x /∈WY
b. WX 6= WY i @(x) | x ∈WX, x ∈WY
c. WX ∼= WY i ∃(x) | x ∈WX, x ∈WY
This allows us to dene the relations of identity, dierence and similarity
between non-terminal syntactic objects in set-theoretical terms (see also Krivoc-
hen’s 2015c: 30 Token Collapse operation). Identity holds between WX and WY if
and only if every element of WX is also an element of WY and vice versa (formalized
in (35a)). If this condition obtains, there is also logical equivalence between WX and
WY in all relevant contexts. Logical equivalence is entailed by identity, as it is to
be expected. Dierence holds if and only if there is no common element between
WX and WY, which means that they are not set-theoretically related (formalized
in (35b)). Similarity is a relation in which there are common elements at least -but
not necessarily only- one, between WX and WY (formalized in (35c)).
In a restrictivist derivational model, the generation of ‘momentarily’ illegible
structures can be tolerated if we accept the denition of Soft Crash in Putnam (2010:
6), as we assume there is a ‘local derivational unit’ to repair any violation:
(36) Soft Crash: If a syntactic object α cannot be interpreted at an IL in any and
all of its features, α is neither useable nor legible at IL, i α cannot be combined
with another local derivational unit that repairs the violation(s) of α.
The concept of ‘local derivational unit’ is here restricted to the element in-
troduced in the very next derivational step, provided that DFI holds.
Regarding how categories emerge in the derivational dynamics we have pro-
posed, we will assume that the local relation between the procedural element D
collapses the root’s categorial potential (think of it as the linear combination of all
possible outcomes) to Noun (i.e., sortal entity) without excluding [cause] (e.g., in
derived nominals from causative construals), T collapses it to Verb (extending-into-
time perspective), and P collapses it into Adjective (see Mateu Fontanals 2002), as-
suming the classical categorial matrices minus P, which operates over roots rather
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than being operated on (cf. Piattelli-Palmarini & Vitiello 2015, Piattelli-Palmarini
& Vitiello 2016; for us, only roots are eigenvectors, D, T, and P are Hermitian op-
erators18). The reference restriction process we mentioned above also applies to
categories, as they are not primitives of syntactic theory but arise in the interac-
tion between the syntactic component and the interpretative interfaces. Common
sense may dictate that the primitive cause appears only in verbal (i.e., eventive)
structures, but there is an aspect of the C-I/syntax interface that we have men-
tioned elsewhere and is essential to this: this interface (and possibly, all other in-
terfaces) is not transparent (i.e., there is no exact correlation between a Relational
Semantic Structure and its syntactic realization, as well as there is no exact iso-
morphism between the representations manipulated by two modules, even re-
specting ConsP). Consider the following example (lexico-semantic structures fol-
low Jackendo 2002; Culicover & Jackendo 2005, and Mateu Fontanals 2002):
(37) a. They destroyed the city = [TPastPerf [EA [cause [event GO [location CITY
[TO [√DESTRUCTION]]]]]]]
b. The destroyer of the city = [DDefSg [EA [cause [event GO [location CITY
[TO [√DESTRUCTION]]]]]]]
The correlations we have established follow from strict distributional proper-
ties, and only distributionally specied enough elements are capable of generating
a categorial interpretation (that is why we excluded cause). A lexical item, in our
proposal, is nothing more than the interface-read local relation between a proced-
ural node, distributionally specied enough and a root, allowing an n number of
non-intervenient nodes in between, as in (12) above.
The linguistic instantiation of a particular CS can change the format in which
information is presented, but it cannot delete information, nor can it tamper with
the content. However, we cannot rule out addition of information, coming at least
from two sources:
(i) non-linguistic cognitive systems (in tune with interactive computation:
18Using Dirac notation, if we model roots as ket vectors, then the emergence of categories can
be formalized as follows:
(i) H |ψ〉 = λ|ψ〉
H is an n-by-m matrix, where all possible measure results are represented (what is referred to
as the ‘observables’). ψ〉 is called a ‘ket vector’ (or, in this conguration, an ‘eigenvector’), and is
a vector of n components ordered in a row, with each component being a dimension along which
measurement takes place. λ is an ‘eigenvalue’, which represents the result of measurement, typ-
ically 1 or 0. In the present proposal, the eigenvalue determines the categorial interpretation: for
that, we need at least three possible eigenvalues, say 1 (nominal), -1 (verbal), and 0 (the linear
superposition of those). See also Uriagereka et al. (2016).
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sensory information coming from the immediate situational context, inter-
ferences from the Long Term Memory, etc.);
(ii) redundancy countermeasures given the system’s unavoidable entropy (in-
cluding inectional morphology).
That is, we acknowledge the fact that, if the language-as-a-physical system
thesis is taken seriously and non-metaphorically, as we do, then derivations, un-
folding in real time, are unavoidably entropic. The role of whichever processes
we assume take place between CS and LF is to minimize entropy, in other words,
operations must be justied in faithfulness terms (in the sense the word has in Op-
timality Theory). This is the global perspective, based on Conservation. At the
level of the cycles, each time a cycle is completed the entropy of the derivation
goes up again, but not to the initial value, for there is a trace of previous cycles
in the workspace. Our model cannot pretend that the cognitive system just ig-
nores previous cycles, because this would entail that there can be no global eects
(i.e., cross-cycle dependencies). Entropy decreases at each derivational step at the
cost of energy: the phase space for interpretation is restricted each time a phrase
marker is extended. However, when a cycle is completed and coopted by the rel-
evant IL, entropy levels go back up, to a level slightly below the maximal value for
the immediately previous cycle. This yields a globally entropy minimizing system
(Saddy 2016; Krivochen in progress; Uriagereka (2011)).
A derivation as a whole is thus a dynamical process, in which mutu-
ally orthogonal local and global (morpho-phonological and semantic) tendencies
struggle, giving rise to frustrated cycles of decreasing entropy. This is character-
ized by an overall sinusoidal entropy pattern, with each period corresponding to
a derivational cycle (an idea developed in Krivochen in progress). Of course, this
struggle is not perceptible at certain scales (e.g., if we analyze individual constitu-
ents or if we adopt a strictly representational perspective), but is to be found when
looking at the process as a whole.
The idea that there might be ‘something left’ from previous cycles (a prop-
erty that arises naturally in L-grammars in the form of ‘residues’ and ‘extensions’,
as pointed out in Saddy 2016 and Saddy & Krivochen 2016) can also benet from
Feigenson’s (2011) considerations about the ways in which the working memory
represents objects (a theory we have already introduced). If it is possible to ‘atom-
ize’ a chunk of structure for the purposes of further computations (in formal terms,
turning an object |α| of arbitrary complexity into a terminal #α#, with a concomit-
ant loss of dimensionality through squeezing via the center manifold), that would
be akin to taking a number of individual objects and conceptualizing them as a set
(examples of such an operation are memorizing telephone numbers), which
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[...] manages to evade the three-item limit of WM while still pre-
serving access to individual representations of the sets’ contents. This ap-
pears to rely on the hierarchical reorganization of items within memory
(Feigenson 2011: 16).
Even if the ‘three item’ limit could be challenged empirically, the overall
proposal seems plausible to us, and provides an interesting platform for studies
of derivational cycles in connection to memory issues. For the time being, we
will simply say that, if the human mind is capable of performing operations of
the kind Feigenson proposes with representations (which in turn requires repres-
entations to have a certain exibility in their format, something we have argued
for in Krivochen 2015a and Krivochen & Schmerling 2015), additional stipulations
would be required to support a claim that these operations do not apply to lin-
guistic representations because of some putative specic property. If the gener-
ative (structure-building) engine is not specic to a faculty (contra Hauser et al.
2002 and much subsequent work within ‘biolinguistics’) the computational tools
required to perform the structural operations over objects Feigenson puts forth are
thus available all throughout the mind, a perspective we consider highly desirable.
In the scenario we have sketched, it is very unlikely that entropy keeps go-
ing back to maximal entropy ‘as combinations proceed’ cycle after cycle (note that
we are making no claim with respect to the properties of the combinatory engine
in terms of the elements it manipulates or how it does that, see Krivochen 2015a,
2015c for details of our take on the issue): that, we would expect from a ‘dumb sys-
tem’ with no operative memory, despite having a possibly innite tape (an auto-
maton, in the sense we have reviewed). A system with a nite, but nonzero, oper-
ative memory (a.k.a. working memory / episodic buer / RAM ...) would not just
wipe out each and every trace of previous cycles if derivations are indeed some-
thing close to ‘incremental’. We will expand on this globally cumulative dynamics
in the following section.
4 Derivational crumbs in a cycle-based system
Theoretical / conceptual issues are related to the desideratum that deriva-
tions be somehow globally ‘cumulative’ in a non-trivial sense. Uriagereka (2011)
has proposed the following principle relating structure generation and entropy:
(38) Reduction of Entropy at Merge (REM): Two elds Ψα and Ψβ combine
via Merge if and only if SΨα, Ψβ < [SΨα + SΨβ]
Notice that the condition (which relates the entropy S corresponding to two
eld perturbations that interfere via Merge) includes a biconditional, meaning
there is no instance of Merge that does not reduce entropy. While this is desir-
able (and, in fact, can be seen as the interface-dened side of the Extension Con-
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dition + Full Interpretation Principle coin that shapes derivations in Minimalism
– at least in theory), it sure has to be relativized taking into account interface re-
quirements at dierent derivational points, and also contemplating the possibility
that S{Ψα, Ψβ} = [S{Ψα} + S{Ψβ}] at least for a ‘derivational turn’ (see, e.g., Putnam
2010: 6 on the concepts of ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ crash19). For the time being, we assume
that the REM condition applies by cycles, in consonance with the MSO model rst
developed by Uriagereka.
We would like to maintain the essential insight of Uriagereka’s (2011) REM,
but at a global derivational level (i.e., not at the application of every structure
building operation, as we have argued above), we want to restrict it to within
cycles. Uriagereka (2011: 23) claims that ‘the entire point of linguistic combination
is to reduce uncertainty’, with which we agree. However, the immediately following
strengthening of the hypothesis is what we question:
As combinations proceed, we gain certainty; the ideal (nal) combin-
ation between elds should reduce uncertainty to zero. We may see this
procedure as another way of achieving representational stability, and we
may take the REM to be the way the language faculty has to ensure that
only objects whose certainty has either being achieved or stipulated [...]
can be handled by the interpretive components. (Uriagereka (2011): 23)
Certainty always comes at a cost, and we follow the physical insight of Heis-
enberg’s Uncertainty Principle20 in that absolute certainty is not attainable (as it
would cancel out the whole term, if Δx or Δp were equal to 0). While we are fully
aware that the Uncertainty Principle was formulated having in mind position and
momentum of a particle, a wider interpretation (not unfaithful to the original for-
mulation) acknowledges that, as we said above, certainty always comes at a cost.
Representational stability, as Uriagereka points out, is desirable; however, we do
not see it as something to be ‘achieved’ (in any teleological sense), but only as part
of the dynamics of the system, which oscillates between stability and instability.
Both are essential to the non-linear dynamics of the system, and derive problem-
atic aspects of the interaction between systems with dierent computational and
topological properties (a clear case, which we will analyze below, is linearization
19Michael T. Putnam (p. c.) comments in this respect that ‘My feeling now is that the only “hard
crash” that essentially must be avoided is the one at the end of the derivation as a well-formedness
constraint as such.’ Interestingly, this implies that measures of optimization during the deriva-
tional process are ‘soft’, thus allowing the system to hold a momentarily non-convergent piece of
structure in the episodic buer to see if a local operation can introduce an element to solve the
ill-formedness of that piece of structure.
20 As a reminder, the Uncertainty Principle is enunciated formally as follows: ∆x∆p ≈ ~2 (to be
read: uncertainty in position times uncertainty in momentum is of the order of Planck’s reduced
constant h2pi over 2).
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of structure, which implies dimensionality reduction as well as drastic changes in
the morphology – in the non-linguistic sense – of the relevant object).
A somewhat disconnected argument in favor of taking maximal disorder as
an asymptote rather than as a true state of the system comes from a perspective
related to brain dynamics. Assume we have a statistical model that assigns mental
states an activation probability between 0 and 1 over discrete time spans (a simpli-
ed hypothetical scenario built by Spivey 2007: 43.). Even if we were assuming
that mental processes are digital, and computation was function-based along the
lines of Gallistel and King (2010) (none of which claims applies in the context of
the present work), the problem still remains of why the system reacts and proceeds
under sub-optimal conditions (i.e., with probabilities of less than 1). In this respect,
Spivey (2007: 47) claims that
Under realistic circumstances, changing perceptual input and con-
tinuous motor output would generally prevent the system from ever
achieving 1.0 activation [i.e., full certainty] for any mental state.
The reason is that response thresholds (cognitive, motor, etc.) are always
lower than 1.0, that is, we make choices on the basis of incomplete information and
with less than absolute certainty (a point that we made above, both in connection
with interactive-based computation and the resolution of a dynamical frustration
between velocity in response and accuracy in response). This allows the system to
proceed swiftly ‘from near-attractor to near-attractor’ more quickly and eciently,
in response to new multimodal inputs and interactions (using Schöner’s terms).
This is consistent with the idea that 0 and 1 are asymptotes rather than legitimate
attractor points the system can ‘go into’ (Spencer et al. 2009: 109). Notice that this
argument also prevents activation probabilities of 0.0, since
In real life, we are very rarely in situations where we have nothing at
all on our minds, and then suddenly a stimulus impinges on our minds,
instigating a new trajectory through mental space (Spivey 2007: 47)
In other words, we do not ever start processing from scratch; we never stop
processing the world around us, and under interactive assumptions, outputs and
inputs are entangled, which means that the output of a process is the input of
another in a continuous ongoing process (see also Milner 2006: 6–7; Goldin &
Wegner 2007: 2), something both behaviorists and cognitivists overlooked (Spivey
2007: 48). This is not incompatible with the idea presented above about rest states,
for those states, as we specied, do not equal 0 (i.e., the eigenvector correspond-
ing to the ground state |n〉 is most emphatically not |0〉), the resting state does
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not correspond to a 0.0 activation (rather, |0〉 would be no activity at all, which
corresponds to being dead).21
In order to support the argument that there are traces of previous deriva-
tional cycles in the workspace empirically, we should need evidence of phenom-
ena involving cross-cycle dependencies. Moreover, those phenomena, if existent,
should not be reducible to operations applying in a ‘punctuated’ fashion cycle-by-
cycle (as would be the case of Wh-movement in orthodox Minimalism, see Abels &
Bentzen 2009 for a generative perspective; Krivochen 2015cfor a relativized cyclic
proposal involving Wh- interrogatives, parasitic gaps, and multiple-gap construc-
tions). Let us consider an example like (39):22
(39) Every man and woman who went to a place wants to see it again
If the proposal about structure building made in Krivochen (2015a) is along
the right lines (even in its general assumptions), then we are in the presence of
a computationally mixed phrase marker, in which we can nd dependencies be-
longing to dierent levels in the Chomsky Hierarchy co-existing within a phrase
marker. The example is complex in its own right, so we will focus on two well-
dened aspects of it: quantier scope and agreement. Assuming the semantically-
based structure for coordination proposed in Krivochen (2015a: 551.) and Krivoc-
hen & Schmerling (2015), the subject presents a universal quantier [every] having
scope over a nite-state unit [man and woman], which is derived via n-ary concat-
enation. This unit is actually the result of taking the objects [man] and [woman]
and mentally representing them as a Markovian set, partially following Feigenson
(2011). This unit is also modied by a restrictive relative clause RRCl (in traditional
descriptive terms, which will do for the purposes of the present discussion) that
select a subset of the potential denotata for [man and woman], namely, those [who
went to a place]. Apart from the quanticational ambiguity in [a place] (which is
also present in [every man and woman [RRCl]], and denes two possible interpret-
ations, roughly a collective reading and an individual reading23), the whole clause
21See Piattelli-Palmarini & Vitiello (2015, 2016) for more details about the use of Dirac notation
for derivational stages.
22This example, of course, owes much to historically prior examples like Peter Geach’s ‘donkey
sentences’, but we have modied some aspects, like the coordination in the subject, to strengthen
our point. However, a pure example of ‘donkey anaphora’ would work as well.
23These readings could be expressed in terms of ‘strong’ (every / each) vs. ‘weak’ (all) quantiers,
following the lines of the distinction made in Krivochen (2012). There, we also hypothesized that
weak Q are used only if the possibility of using the strong Q is for some reason not available, thus
generating the (conventional? Generalized conversational?) implicature that the speaker cannot
use the strong Q because it either does not apply or because the speaker lacks the relevant in-
formation to make a statement using the strong Q (not unlike Grice’s 1975: 49 examples of relative
hierarchy among maxims).
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enters an interesting relation with the universal Q: is it the case that [every] mod-
ies [man and woman who went to a place] or does the RRCl modify [every man
and woman]? So far, phenomena seem quite local. Here is when the [it] enters the
game: clearly, there is great structural distance between the pronoun and its refer-
ential antecedent. Let us graph the relevant objects using familiar square bracket
notation for constituency:
(40) [[every [man and woman] [who went to a place]] [wants to see it [again]]]
In (40), each bracketed object is a nite-state compatible element (a ‘com-
mand unit’, in Uriagereka’s 2002a terms), which means its structure can be ex-
haustively represented by means of nite state processes (so-called ‘monotonic’
structure building, Uriagereka 2002c: 151). Relations among these units are ‘non-
monotonic’, and go beyond nite-state computability24 (Uriagereka 2002b, 2012:
53; Krivochen 2015a). Now consider again the relation between [it] and its ante-
cedent [a place]: the pronoun, which belongs to a command unit, establishes a
relation with an element embedded within two levels of monotonicity. This rela-
tion is twofold: not only is there a semantic relation regarding referentiality, but
also a morphological relation, which surfaces as number agreement (cf. [*every
man and woman who went to a placei wants to see themi/j again], subindexes
indicating the endophoric relations), but it is not deterministic: the singular mor-
phology is also acceptable, in the collective reading. If the proposal about binding
we made in Krivochen (2015b) is along the right lines, then the pronoun is a logical
variable, whose phonological exponent depends on the relation it establishes with
another element in the overall structure across the limits of a single cycle: such a
relation goes beyond the limits of the monotonic unit containing [it]. How is this
relation possible? Consider Feigenson’s concept of set, which allows access the
relevant elements, even though these are conceptualized as a unit for WM pur-
poses: it is plausible that an object of the kind of Feigenson’s sets remains active
in the workspace as a ‘trace’ of previous cycles, optimally limiting the existence of
these traces by the same means by which the limits of WM (or the ‘episodic buf-
fer’) are determined. We will also see that the persistence of remnants of previous
cycles as proposed above is essential to account for instances of binding that seem
to defy non-stipulative attempts of explanation, and will also prove useful when
considering islandhood and Wh- dependencies (all of which have been subsumed
to operator-variable relations in MGG).
It seems that there are both theoretical and empirical arguments in favor of a
certain amount of ‘globality’, which includes cross-cycle relations. How does this
impact the entropy dynamics?
24This does not amount to saying their interpretation can be carried out by means of a nite-state
automaton, we are simply making a statement about the way in which elements are blindly put
together.
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If there are ‘traces’ or ‘remnants’ of previous cycles in the workspace, which
can be projected back to previous derivational stages (again, following the L-
grammatical formalism analyzed in Saddy 2016), then it is not possible that en-
tropy goes back to the maximum level (asymptotically tending to 1) after the com-
pletion of a cycle, since the next cycle does not start ‘from scratch’. This means
there is a dierence between Maxh (the maximum entropy value, that is, complete
disorder) and the entropy level at the beginning of a cycle. We will call this dier-
ence Δh, for h = entropy. If derivations proceed in a cumulative manner, not only
locally (within cycles, with each application of the structure building operation
to active objects {a, b, ..., n}) but also globally (i.e., across cycles, which is roughly
Uriagereka’s 2011 idea of global entropy reduction), then it is reasonable to assume
Δh is not constant, but increases as derivational cycles are completed and there are
more ‘traces’ of what the system has already computed in the workspace. We shall
say that Δh increases per cycle by a factor n, where nΔh < Maxh. We can now
make the following hypothesis about the dynamics of the derivational system:
(41) Hypothesis 1: There is no derivation for which Maxh – n(Δh) = 0.
Corollary: dh
dt
cannot be 0 for t > 0.




Let f(t) = h, f(t’) = h’ for all t, t’ = t + Δt, such that h’ < h 6Maxh
In plain English now, derivations display cumulative eects, meaning we do
not start from square one (or zero) at every derivational point: the phase space
where attractors for our dynamical system can be found gets smaller and smal-
ler (but the system never reaches complete certainty, as Spivey 2007 points out).
The system zig-zags its way through a eld of attractors, without ever falling into
one (see Spencer et al. 2009 for a discussion about the status of cognitive rep-
resentations as either stable attractors or near-equilibrium states) Hypothesis 1
captures this intuition, the idea that with every derivational step, entropy is re-
duced at the cost of introducing a new element in the working area, modifying its
topological properties (and consuming energy). Since derivations display cyclic
properties, the same cumulative informational eects can be extended to the cycle
level: no cycle within a derivation starts at the same level of maximum entropy
as the previous cycle; we have won something in the meantime, and that some-
thing is certainty with respect to the location of interpretative attractors. If the
term Maxh – n(Δh) was equal to 0, that would mean we would be in the presence
of a non-cumulative process, in which each cycle takes us back to a state of near
complete uncertainty. Moreover, global semantic eects would not be attainable,
for the workspace would have to be wiped clean of variables, operators, etc. (oth-
erwise we could not get back to Maxh). There are, as we suggested, theoretical
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and empirical arguments in favor of accepting Hypothesis 1, or some equivalent
formulation, as holding for syntactic derivations.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we have presented some issues pertaining to linguistic deriva-
tions from a PoL perspective, particularly, how a cyclic cumulative engine yields
locally counter-entropic dynamics, at the cost of energy inputs (external perturb-
ations which disrupt the ground state of cognitive dynamics, as argued in Saddy
2016; Krivochen in progress). A dynamical eld-theoretic approach to cognition,
at the levels of computation and physiology, not only reveals possible motivations
for ubiquitous properties of cognition (like locality and chunking), but also integ-
rates cognition with other physical systems. Such integration must be based on
explicit claims about scale and the way in which dierent processes at dierent
scales can emerge from the same underlying process; essentially an oscillatory
engine. In connection with the last point, we have claimed that one of the most
important properties of cognition is that it displays tensions between mutually
incompatible tendencies at dierent levels: such a tension is called a dynamical
frustration, and it is this frustration that derives cycles. Bearing in mind questions
of scale, it is possible and even necessary to take advantage of developments in
physics and mathematics (e.g., quantum eld theory, electrodynamics, topology)
in order to characterize aspects of cognition that resist characterization in clas-
sical terms (roughly, the classical view is the proposal that the mind is a digital
computer, see Gallistel & King 2010 for a development of this perspective). On the
approach presented in this paper, ‘syntax’ is a topological operation over metric
and non-metric elds all throughout the mind.
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